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Professor Rachel Barkow has established herself as an indispensable voice in public and academic discourse on criminal justice reform. Beyond the very important contributions to the world
of scholarship that earned her a well-deserved place in this “mostcited” list, she has also shaped policy directly (most notably as a
member of the U.S. Sentencing Commission from 2013 to 2018),
as well as influenced the education of countless law students
through her coauthorship of the leading criminal law casebook.1
She is also an expert on administrative law and on the separation
of powers, and this shapes her distinct perspective on the way the
criminal justice system works. Several of Barkow’s relatively
early pieces on these topics are her most cited (unsurprisingly, as
they have been available to cite for longer), but for reasons of
space and my own lack of administrative-law expertise, I won’t
focus this short piece on them.2 Rather, I will focus on Barkow’s
most substantial recent intervention in criminal justice reform
debates: her 2019 book, Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle
of Mass Incarceration.
My comments here serve as a miniature book review—but
published two years belatedly and thus with the benefit of hindsight. The world has changed more in this short time than anyone
in 2019 could have expected, and some of the book’s arguments
land differently today than they might have then. Still, the book
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remains essential reading, and most of its insights still hold. I will
begin by praising its many strengths, even though I ultimately
diverge from Barkow on a core argument of the book—that criminal justice policy should be institutionally shielded from politics
and delegated in substantial part to expert bodies.
I. OUR BROKEN JUSTICE SYSTEM: BARKOW’S DIAGNOSTIC
INSIGHTS
Prisoners of Politics serves on one level as a tour-de-force review and searing indictment of the many overwhelming failings
of our criminal justice system. Many of these are familiar to those
steeped in this area of law, but Barkow shows effectively how they
have worked in combination to drive the growth of mass incarceration and to make it difficult to end it. Her writing is clear and
accessible to lay readers, yet filled with insights that academics
will appreciate; it is a model of public-intellectual argument. She
begins the book with five chapters laying out different categories
of failures and injustices, and there is little here with which to
disagree; it is a sad but accurate picture.
The first set of problems surround the criminal laws themselves. They are too broad, sweeping in an ever-expanding scope.3
And, crucially, they are too “lumpy”—they fail to draw distinctions between types of conduct that ought to be punished very differently.4 Take, for example, drug sentencing that is driven
mainly by quantity, or sentencing for economic offenses that is
driven mainly by the dollar value of the loss; neither accounts
properly for the defendant’s role in the offense or their mental
state, factors that are relevant both to moral culpability and to
future crime risk.5 Another example is the felony murder doctrine, which treats accidental killings (by the defendant or, often,
a co-conspirator) as essentially equivalent to intentional ones.6
Lumpiness in criminal law produces harshness because sentencing policy tends to be shaped to respond to the worst examples of
a broad category of crimes; this problem is especially egregious

3
RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS
INCARCERATION 19 (2019) (“The popular discussion around a given crime tends to focus on
the worst category of offenders, while the statute defining the elements of the crime often
sweeps far more broadly, bringing in cases that no rational voter would have ever imagined belonged to that category.”).
4
See id. at 22.
5
See id. at 22–23.
6
See id. at 25–26.
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when it drives harsh mandatory minimums, given that one would
think by definition that the minimum sentence for a crime ought
to be tailored to the least serious version of it.7
Second, sentencing is simply too harsh, unsupported by any
reasonable theory of punishment, and unmoored from empirical
evidence; Barkow argues that our overattachment to incarceration may be counterproductive for public safety. In particular,
long sentences have little benefit in terms of deterrence, and incarceration of older people who are many years past their crimes
has little incapacitation benefit.8 She also surveys the many costs
that mass incarceration has for individuals and communities as
well as its fiscal costs.9
Third, our prisons and jails “do almost nothing to rehabilitate
offenders,” and people exiting them are accordingly ill-prepared
for reentry and more likely to recidivate.10 Barkow cites empirical
evidence that many treatment, education, and training programs can reduce recidivism (to say nothing of their other benefits for individuals), but these kinds of services are offered only
minimally in U.S. corrections.11 In this chapter, Barkow also
makes the distinct point that pretrial detention is also used in
excess, largely due to the cash bail system. She argues that
quantitative risk assessment tools can reduce detention without
harm to public safety or trial appearance rates.12
Fourth, Barkow describes the decline of discretionary parole
(abolished in some states and curtailed in others)13 as well as
other “second-look mechanisms” that can take account of the
changing risk that an individual poses over time.14 These include
compassionate release, the use of which is minimal, and executive
clemency (another area of Barkow’s expertise), which gave way to
parole as the primary second-look mechanism in the early twentieth century but failed to reemerge as a frequently used alternative in jurisdictions that abolished parole.15
Finally, Barkow reviews the ever-proliferating web of collateral consequences that entangle individuals, often for life, after
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

See id. at 36.
BARKOW, supra note 3, at 38–55.
See id. at 46–50.
See id. at 18, 56–72.
See id. at 61–67.
See id. at 57–61.
See BARKOW, supra note 3, at 78–81.
See id. at 18, 73–87.
See id. at 81–87.
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they have finished their sentences. These, she argues, are deeply
counterproductive for recidivism prevention, ungrounded in empirics, and incredibly harsh in their results.16 They are also classic
examples of “lumpy laws,” as they tend to be triggered by any felony or by broad categories of felonies, with no accounting for individual circumstances.17
On all these points (except, perhaps, the embrace of risk assessment, of which I am less enamored), I find Barkow’s analysis
thoroughly convincing. Moreover, I am also largely convinced by
her assessment of the reasons things have gone so wrong. These
include elected officials and their constituents responding to particular high-profile crimes with hasty, overly sweeping legislation;18 more generally, a “populist politics” that is sensitive to
crime victims, insensitive to the costs of incarceration, and
shaped by a media culture that sensationalizes crime;19 prosecutors with far too much power and incentives to push for harsh
policies and harsh results in individual cases;20 and courts that,
with a few exceptions, have failed to protect defendants’ procedural rights or to constrain the excesses of sentencing law.21 All
of this is accurate. It could be criticized, perhaps, for somewhat
underemphasizing the role of racism—structural and otherwise—
but it is not incompatible with more race-focused explanations.
Barkow’s account shares much in common with Professor
William Stuntz’s assessment, nearly twenty years earlier, of the
“pathological politics of criminal law,” which remains essential
reading on how mass incarceration came to be.22 But hindsight
tells us that Stuntz was not entirely accurate in his predictions;
criminal law did not turn out to be a “one-way ratchet” to an everincreasing prison population.23 Incarceration has, in fact, declined
lately, and most criminal justice policymaking today surrounds
the question of how to reduce incarceration as well as the burdens
of intensive and violent policing.24 Nobody could say we have gone
far in this direction; we still have a sprawling carceral state and
16

See id. at 88–102.
See id. at 96.
18 See BARKOW, supra note 3, at 19.
19 See id. at 106–10.
20 See id. at 129–30.
21 See id. at 130–31.
22 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
23 Id. at 509.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 33–36.
17
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a long, long way to go. The question is how to get there, which is
where I diverge from Barkow’s conclusions.
II. CAN THE PATH FORWARD BE DIVORCED FROM POLITICS?
Barkow’s prescriptive arguments in Prisoners of Politics are
provocative and reflect her scholarly strengths, bringing to bear
her administrative law expertise. One set of her proposals concerns structuring prosecutors’ offices to provide checks against
the tendency to use discretion in ways that ratchet up harshness.
For example, she argues that charging and plea-bargaining decisions should be in the hands of a different—and likely more senior—prosecutor than the one (if any) who was involved with the
investigative stage of a case. This proposal reflects the principle
that adjudicative decisions (which she considers charging and
plea bargaining to be, because they so powerfully shape outcomes)
should be separated from investigative ones.25 The hope is that
the charging prosecutor would be less invested in getting the biggest “win” possible (i.e., the most serious conviction and sentence)
and would be able to draw on experience in seeking an outcome
that is both fair and a good use of the state’s incarceration resources. This, like her other proposals concerning prosecutors, is
an interesting idea worth testing; it’s an empirical question what
the effect on outcomes would be, and I have no strong prior, but I
would like to see data on it. I suspect that Barkow, an advocate of
empirically driven policy, would agree.
Another set of proposals—and an overarching theme of the
book, as the title suggests—concerns the need to separate criminal justice policy from the political process. In Barkow’s view—
like Stuntz’s years ago—our criminal justice politics are so broken
as to be likely irredeemable. Populist impulses will always tend
toward panics over crime waves or even individual crimes, will
never be sufficiently attentive to empirical evidence concerning
what actually promotes public safety, and will always give too little weight to the interests of defendants. Barkow acknowledges
some change in this momentum, including the progressive prosecutor movement, various reform efforts, and the recent downturn in incarceration rates.26 But she argues that all these
changes are just chipping away at the edges of the carceral state.
Citing an estimate from the Sentencing Project, she states that,
25
26

BARKOW, supra note 3, at 150–51.
See id. at 9–12.
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at the current pace of reduction, it will take seventy-five years
just to cut the incarcerated population in half.27
A better bet, she says, is to use whatever reform momentum
exists in the current moment to put in place institutional changes
that will take crucial policy decisions away from the political process entirely.28 In short, she wants criminal justice policy to be
made by experts in a setting more like an administrative agency.
She argues that we defer to experts outside of electoral politics
when it comes to many other important questions, such as environmental regulatory standards; criminal justice should be no different.29 This institutional-reform theme runs through the book
and connects together Barkow’s various substantive proposals.
Her implication is that, at least if the institutions are set up
wisely, experts removed from politics would be driven by data, not
public whims or political gains, and the data would drive them to
choose the kinds of substantive changes she wants. “Rational reflection will lead to the conclusion that [our current] approaches
need to change, so we just need to get the institutional architecture in place that allows for that rational reflection to take hold.”30
This is a novel and thought-provoking contribution to the
criminal justice reform debate. But I have doubts. I believe
Barkow is too pessimistic about the possibility of change through
political channels, and I fear that she is too optimistic about
achieving it outside those channels. I doubt both whether criminal justice policy can be substantially separated from politics and
whether it should be.
Given how broken our criminal justice politics have been for
so long, one might ask: Is it even possible to be too pessimistic
about their future? And I concede: I don’t know whether the current moment will last and be built on, whether real change is coming. I suspect the United States will never bring incarceration
rates all the way back to our pre-1980s historic norm or to global
averages, both of which are vastly lower than what we have today.31 And we have other challenges besides incarceration numbers—for example, unraveling the web of collateral consequences,

27 Id. at 12–13 (citing Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Can We Wait 75 Years to Cut the Prison
Population in Half?, SENT’G PROJECT (Mar. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/82ME-QZAX).
28 See id. at 15.
29 See id. at 2–3, 15.
30 BARKOW, supra note 3, at 15.
31 See Criminal Justice Facts, SENT’G PROJECT, https://perma.cc/7HEF-P3HX (showing time trends and international comparisons).
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building a correctional system that does anything but warehouse
and punish, and transforming the conduct of police and narrowing their role. We might not get there through politics. But I think
that politics is still our best bet.
This is the question on which the intervening two years has
made the biggest impression. Even the very recent past, it seems,
can be a foreign country.32 Today, after the murder of George
Floyd and after months of protests nationwide, the reader cannot
help but feel a certain disconnect from the idea that “populist politics” on criminal justice are necessarily anti-progressive or supportive of the carceral system. The ideas produced by experts in
an agency-like setting may be good or bad, but I think that it is
quite certain that they will not be as transformative as “defund
the police,” for example. To be sure, in the vast majority of the
United States, the more radical proposals in the present discourse
will surely not carry the day anytime soon, because most people
don’t support them.33 But they have shifted the Overton window,
and the period since Floyd’s murder has seen many reform proposals of various sizes from across the political spectrum. Meanwhile, the coronavirus pandemic has both highlighted our political system’s brutal indifference toward the lives of prisoners (who,
due to inadequate releases and safety measures, were infected at
five times the national rate and died at a higher-than-average
rate despite being a population with relatively few elderly people34) and, even so, has led to the sharpest one-year reduction in
incarceration ever via a wide variety of policies, some of which
may survive the pandemic.35
Even before all this, though, the criminal justice tide was
turning in a way that Prisoners of Politics somewhat understates.
The movement for Black lives had been active for several years.
While that movement has focused mostly on policing, civil rights
organizations and other progressive groups had begun to emphasize decarceration as well, thanks in part to calls to action from
32 See L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-BETWEEN 9 (1953). (“The past is a foreign country; they
do things differently there.”).
33 Sarah Elbeshbishi & Mabinty Quarshie, Fewer Than 1 in 5 Support “Defund the
Police” Movement, USA TODAY (Mar. 8, 2021), https://perma.cc/3TPD-X2ZJ.
34 Covid-19’s Impact on People in Prison, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (last updated Apr.
16, 2021), https://perma.cc/4WZK-SH45.
35 The Most Significant Criminal Justice Policy Changes from the COVID-19 Pandemic, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (last updated Apr. 6, 2021), https://perma.cc/J6WX-ZL57;
Emily Widra, How Much Have COVID-19 Releases Changed Prison and Jail Populations?,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/ZK8B-CUWS.
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Professor Michelle Alexander, Professor Bryan Stevenson, and
others.36 The progressive-prosecutor movement was well under
way. And libertarian and fiscally conservative voices had joined
with liberals in supporting reforms.37
Barkow acknowledges these factors but finds the potential for
serious change too limited. But while it’s true that most criminal
justice reforms have focused on low-hanging fruit (nonviolent
crime, first-time offenders, marijuana), this isn’t uniformly so,
and it hasn’t proven true that if “anyone suggested rolling back
the punishment or collateral consequences for offenses involving
violence . . . they would likely be voted out of office.”38 For example, the groundbreaking Michigan Prisoner ReEntry Initiative—
an early release and reentry program that started in 2003—initially focused entirely on moderate-to-high risk releasees, including those with violent-crime convictions; spearheaded by Governor Jennifer Granholm, it did not prevent her landslide
reelection.39 More recently, most states have adopted policies dialing back some collateral consequences and/or expanding access
to expungement,40 and a new Clean Slate movement has brought
automatic expungement to several states—including, in some, for
violent and other serious offenses.41 Meanwhile, some of Barkow’s
examples of minimally ambitious reforms actually happened
many years ago. For instance, the federal drug laws’ safety valve
was adopted in 1994, during the absolute heart of the tough-oncrime era; it’s no surprise that it didn’t help most defendants.42

36 See generally, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY:
A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2014).
37 In a review of Prisoners of Politics, Rebecca Goldstein provides more evidence of
some of these phenomena and also presents survey evidence giving another reason for
long-term optimism—more liberal views on criminal justice among millennial and younger
voters. Rebecca Goldstein, The Politics of Decarceration, 129 YALE L.J. 446, 472–80 (2019)
(reviewing BARKOW, supra note 3).
38 BARKOW, supra note 3, at 13.
39 See MICH. PRISONER REENTRY INITIATIVE, 2008 PROGRESS REPORT 4–5 (2008),
https://perma.cc/M2LM-GADG.
40 See
MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, REDUCING BARRIERS TO
REINTEGRATION: FAIR CHANCE AND EXPUNGEMENT REFORMS IN 2018, at 2 (2019);
MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, PATHWAYS TO REINTEGRATION: CRIMINAL RECORD
REFORMS IN 2019, at 10 (2020).
41 See, e.g., H.R. 4980, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2020); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.425 (West 2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-5.4 (West 2021).
42 BARKOW, supra note 3, at 34–35; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (1994).

2021]

Professor Rachel Barkow

1783

The recent decline in incarceration rates is not trivial, and
racial disparities—while still enormous—have also declined. Between 2006 and 2019, a period that excludes the Covid decline,
the Black incarceration rate fell by 34%, the Hispanic rate by
26%, and the white rate by 17%.43 But what about that sobering
“75 years” projection from the Sentencing Project, which was
based on data running through 2017 and implies a slower rate of
change?44 It was always based on strong assumptions about the
shape of the curve (meaning that slight changes in the current
slope could change the projection by quite a lot), and it was always
somewhat misleading to base the projection on absolute and not
per-capita rates. In the next two years, decarceration accelerated,
and the projection was updated first to sixty-five years, then to
fifty-seven.45 This is still depressingly long, to be sure, but, adjusting for expected population growth,46 it actually represents the
expected time frame for a 60% reduction in per capita incarceration rates (not 50%), and the estimate could continue to come
down rapidly if reform momentum continues to grow.
The point is not that we should be satisfied, obviously; it’s
that we should be hopeful. And that hope is grounded not in an
emerging role of professional experts but in changed politics, including a growing public passion about injustice.
But is Barkow right about the best way to take advantage of
this moment? There is wisdom in the general idea of trying to
adopt reforms that will be self-sustaining even when the political
winds change. I am just not sure that expert administrators are
the answer.
I do empirical research on criminal justice for a living, and I
love the idea of making policy in this field more data-driven. But
Barkow may be underestimating how hard it is to put together
empirical studies to guide policy and how hard it is to make sense
of conflicting studies in search of the “right” answer. The majority
of empirical studies in this field (as in all of the social sciences, I
43 John Gramlick, Black Imprisonment Rate in the U.S. Has Fallen by a Third Since
2006, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/FX3X-MXPS. The Black and Hispanic rates remain 5.6 times and 3 times the white rate, respectively. See id.
44 Ghandnoosh, supra note 27.
45 Nazgol Ghandnoosh, U.S. Prison Decline: Insufficient to Undo Mass Incarceration,
SENT’G PROJECT (May 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/FV8Z-USQ3; Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Can
We Wait 60 Years to Cut the Prison Population in Half?, SENT’G PROJECT (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://perma.cc/WD2Z-STWY.
46 Projections come from this site: Population Pyramids of the World from 1950 to
2100, POPULATIONPYRAMID.NET, https://perma.cc/NS4Q-ZXMT.
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suspect) aren’t especially good, flaws are not typically flagged on
the surface for unfamiliar readers, and even good studies often
have results that turn on readily contestable methodological
choices. Experimental work (the gold standard for inferring causation) can rarely be conducted in criminal justice, and other
causal inference methods using observational data may be viable
but are often fraught. Studies are extremely resource- and timeintensive to produce. And those that already exist—despite the
efforts of innumerable academic criminologists, economists, legal
empiricists, psychologists, and others—address only a small fraction of the countless empirical questions embedded in the construction and implementation of a system of criminal laws (for
example, the proper sentencing ranges for hundreds of different
crimes). It is unlikely that whatever experts would be available
to these hypothetical new criminal-justice-policy offices in every
jurisdiction across the country would be able to do better.
But perhaps experts don’t need data-driven answers to every
question; it would be an improvement to have them for the big
questions that cut across many decisions. The problem is that for
many of these big questions, which have drawn academic attention, there’s no real consensus. For example, do longer sentences
increase crime, or do they reduce it? No clear answer emerges
from academic literature (as Barkow knows; she both cites evidence that they are criminogenic and acknowledges that they
might not be).47 There is a pretty strong consensus that at least
beyond a certain point, increased sentences have at best a modest
general deterrent effect.48 But incapacitation effects are much
harder to dismiss,49 and research has also produced differing results on postrelease recidivism.50 What if an expert reviews a
47 BARKOW, supra note 3, at 44–45 (citing evidence that increasing sentences “does
not always bring a reduction in crime” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 49 (“None of this
is to say that lower sentences are always better. . . . But all too often, there are better
options for promoting public safety than long sentences.”).
48 See Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 24–32 (2017).
49 Barkow, indeed, acknowledges them. BARKOW, supra note 3, at 46.
50 David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905, 929–36 (2013) (reviewing literature). Barkow suggests that an
expert weighing criminogenic effects on recidivism against crime-reducing incapacitation
effects would “inevitably” favor “shortening many sentences so that people are not locked
away beyond the point at which they would age out of their crimes in any case.” BARKOW,
supra note 3, at 46–47. And this may be true (the aging-out phenomenon also has an empirical consensus behind it—although age should also mitigate any criminogenic effects).
Id. at 46. But it also may have the uncomfortable implication that those who would otherwise be released before they age out of crime should be kept in prison until they do. Note
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study, or many, and concludes that incarceration does reduce
crime on balance? How is this to be weighed against incarceration’s costs? This is an enormously complicated question because
incarceration has many costs (as Barkow persuasively outlines51)
and because the question of how to value the cost of crime is also
highly contested.52
Difficult doesn’t necessarily mean not worth doing; indeed, to
the extent policy is based on empirical assumptions, I think that
policymakers (whoever they may be) should of course try to make
sense of the evidence supporting those assumptions. But the problem becomes worse if this interpretation isn’t done in good faith—
or, more generously, is done with the sort of motivated reasoning
to which all humans are prone. And this raises a related concern:
what if the expert scientists or their policy-setting bosses are not
the right ones?
If you gave me the option today of placing all of criminal justice policy in the hands of an office that would be run for all time
by, say, Rachel Barkow, I would take that in a heartbeat, and I
am sure that much would quickly improve. But my idea of a reasoned thinker is not everybody’s, and ultimately, even in an
agency one seeks to depoliticize, presumably politicians in power
would have some influence over who is in it. For example, former
Attorney General Jeff Sessions ascribed the label “the greatest
thinker on criminal justice in America today” to Heather Mac
Donald,53 author of such works as The War on Cops and The Diversity Delusion—a person with elite degrees, a think tank post,
and an enormous following. My views on Mac Donald are different,54 but it’s plain that some consider her an expert, even a
leading one. “Expert” labels do not necessarily imply that a person is apolitical or that they are neutrally driven by data that inevitably takes them to a “rational” outcome. Barkow points out
that parole boards, once the province of rehabilitation-focused experts, “have become political bodies made up largely of people
that the studies that Abrams reviews (although most do not support specific deterrence
effects) similarly do not suggest that additional prison time is, on balance, criminogenic.
Abrams, supra, at 929–36.
51 See BARKOW, supra note 3, at 46–48.
52 Abrams, supra note 50, at 940–46.
53 Heather Mac Donald Bio, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE, https://perma.cc/X8EU-X6MX
(quoting Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the 2018 Annual Meeting of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (June 26, 2018)).
54 Sonja
Starr
(@SonjaStarr),
TWITTER
(June
15,
2020),
https://perma.cc/SK5W-HAAV.
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with law enforcement backgrounds.”55 But what’s to stop the same
thing from happening to any entity with power in the criminal
justice system? One can potentially use this moment to create institutions, but one cannot control permanently who is in them.
Expert administrators have, in criminal justice and other
contexts, not always pushed law or policy in progressive directions. This is especially true when leaders are partisan appointees; take the Department of Justice, or basically any agency, during the Trump administration. The Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, which Barkow treats as a model, has been
criticized for its structurally antiregulatory role.56 Indeed, even
the courts themselves can be seen as a sort of expert institution,
removed from politics (more so than any executive agency could
be), especially at the federal level with life tenure and no elections, and yet Barkow correctly observes that they have “taken
the wrong legal turn” again and again, with “devastating”
consequences.57
Or consider the complex example of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which Barkow rightly credits with achieving some important recent changes, including the retroactive release of thousands of drug prisoners.58 But the Commission’s role has not
uniformly cut in that direction, and not only because Congress
has forced it to render the Guidelines ever harsher, as Barkow
observes.59 For example, a month after the Supreme Court struck
down the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines scheme in United
States v. Booker,60 and then again a year later, the Commission’s
chair went to Congress to testify strongly in favor of the Guidelines continuing to be given heavy weight, including asking Congress to codify appellate review standards that would so require.61
In the coming years, the Commission’s in-house empiricists produced a series of reports purporting to show that Booker had
caused a spike in racial disparity; these used dubious methods on
55

BARKOW, supra note 3, at 79.
E.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1312–14, 1329 (2006).
57 BARKOW, supra note 3, at 191.
58 Id. at 171–72.
59 See id. at 171.
60 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
61 See generally Prepared Testimony: Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Judge
Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n); Prepared Testimony: Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2006) (statement of Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n).
56
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a number of fronts, and the conclusion was unconvincing.62 All
these efforts may have been quite sincerely undertaken (although
they did amount to a political defense of the Commission’s power,
which Booker undercut), but they were certainly not progressive.
Booker inarguably reduced sentences for defendants of all races
by freeing judges to vary (nearly always downward) from the
Guidelines. It helped to constrain prosecutorial power by empowering judges—and thus constrained the potential role of prosecutors as a source of disparity.63 A move to make the Guidelines
closer to mandatory again (which fortunately Congress did not do
and which would likely not have survived the Supreme Court,
judging by later-established precedent64) would have reversed
these steps.
Beyond these practical problems, there is a deeper concern.
Decisions about criminal law and policy are, at bottom, not technocratic. They are intrinsically normative. They are a fundamental tool for the polity to express core moral commitments.
Sentencing-policy decisions and the drafting of substantive criminal law involve a balance between conflicting interests—utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment, concerns about disparities and distributive impacts, procedural concerns about
notice and due process, understandings of the freedoms on which
criminal restrictions encroach, and more.
None of these can be dictated by data. Indeed, even the quantitative analysis of data is shot through with normative choices.
For example, every time a researcher specifies an empirical model
to estimate disparities in criminal justice outcomes, the choice of
what control variables to put into the model will shape the nature
of what’s being estimated; this seemingly technical choice expresses something about what kind of inequalities we care
about.65

62 See generally Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial
Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2
(2013) [hereinafter Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity]; Sonja B. Starr & M.
Marit Rehavi, On Estimating Disparity and Inferring Causation: Sur-Reply to the U.S.
Sentencing Commission Staff, 123 YALE L.J.F. 273 (2013).
63 See generally Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity, supra note 62.
64 See generally Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
65 Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity, supra note 62, at 18 (“The choice of
control variables determines what kinds of disparities one is measuring, and so it should
be shaped by a sense of the types of disparities policymakers and stakeholders care
about.”).
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And sometimes, the choices of scientists can be normatively
problematic. Take the context of algorithmic or actuarial risk assessment, a trend in criminal justice that Barkow embraces66 and
that represents perhaps the apotheosis of the idea of data-driven
criminal justice choices. I’m a longstanding critic of this trend,67
but I’ll admit that the specific instrument that Barkow focuses
on—the Arnold Foundation’s pretrial-risk-assessment tool—
doesn’t bother me much. It incorporates only age and criminal
history variables, and, as Barkow observes, any equity problems
associated with those variables are likely already incorporated in
judges’ decision-making.68 It has served the function of convincing
some states to cut back on cash bail, which is a bigger equity problem. But the risk-assessment trend hasn’t been limited to this
tool. Rather, jurisdictions around the country (guided, often, by
various sorts of expert panels) have frequently adopted, and
based sentences and other decisions on, other instruments that
contain deeply problematic socioeconomic and demographic variables, like zip code (often essentially a race proxy), employment
status, housing instability, and the like.69 For algorithm designers
who see themselves as engaged in a neutral scientific exercise,
using these variables is attractive; anything that has predictive
power will improve predictions, after all. Whether to seek to maximize predictive power or to accept some loss of it in service of
equality is a normative choice. And in a democracy, within constitutional constraints, collective normative choices about government policy belong properly in the realm of politics.
CONCLUSION
I hope that Barkow will forgive me for using part of this brief
tribute, which I could easily have filled with nothing but points of
praise, to contest one of her book’s central claims. Prisoners of
Politics is a rich, important piece of serious scholarship, and I cannot resist taking an opportunity to engage critically with it. Despite the disagreements outlined above, I consider the book to be
a devastating description of the many dysfunctions of our justice
system. It illustrates the many strengths on which Barkow has
66

BARKOW, supra note 3, at 59.
See generally Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014).
68 See BARKOW, supra note 3, at 59.
69 See Starr, supra note 67, at 821–62 (critiquing the use of evidence-based
sentencing).
67
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built her career, which made her one of our most-cited legal scholars, and with which she will continue to shape her field and the
practice of criminal justice.

